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THE PURSUIT OF MARITIME TRANSFORMATION
Erickson, Andrew S., Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, eds. China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation
in Comparative Historical Perspective. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009. 544pp. $49.95

The third book in the Naval Institute
Press’s Studies in Chinese Maritime Development series is a collection of essays
and case studies that is important not
only for those working in naval studies
and for sinologists, but also for scholars
concerned with the idea of strategic culture and its application.
Following an introduction by Erickson
and Goldstein, the book is organized
into four parts: the premodern era (Persia, Sparta, Rome, and the Ottoman
Empire); the modern era (France, Russia, imperial Germany, and Soviet Russia); Chinese maritime transformations
(Ming and Qing dynasties, the Cold
War); and China in comparative perspective, with essays on contemporary
Chinese shipbuilding prowess, China’s
navy today as it looks toward blue water, and the Chinese study of the rise of
great powers.
The contributors are such renowned
scholars as Barry Strauss, Arthur
Eckstein, James Pritchard, Holger
Herwig, and Bruce Elleman. As stated
in the book’s introduction, a close reading of the case studies reveals distinct
differences between China and other
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powers that have pursued maritime
transformation. Erickson and Goldstein
note that Beijing has an impressive
commercial maritime dynamism and is
uncovering a robust historical maritime
tradition. China understands that stable
relationships with its continental neighbors are a prerequisite for the growth of
maritime power. The issue of Taiwan
and the strategic significance of China’s
maritime trade routes mean there is no
real comparison with the Kremlin’s
pursuit of naval power.
The concluding chapter, by Carnes
Lord on China and maritime transformation, is a key element in this metanarrative of naval history—an approach
that is valuable as a complement to the
customary focus on the leading naval
power but not as a substitute for it.
Lord depicts a genuine maritime transformation, and the case studies provide
a valuable historical perspective, although the chapter’s connection to part
4 is limited.
The most useful chapters are those on
China, because they contribute to the
historical memory of Chinese policy
makers. Elleman notes the extent to
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which defeat helped lead China to modernize its navy; defeat in both opium
wars forced China to bring new ideas to
the forefront. Bernard Cole’s assessment of the Cold War reveals a Chinese
naval service viewed by its military and
civilian masters as an organization
whose primary mission was to support
army forces. Defensive concerns gained
priority, and a new engagement with
naval power had to await the end of the
Cold War.
Current Chinese developments underline the folly of the Western military
posture, with its planning largely focused on Afghanistan and Iran. There is
a serious risk that crucial long-term capability will be sacrificed to the exigencies of campaigning in Afghanistan.
While the development of Chinese capability has led to responses by such regional powers as Japan, Taiwan,
Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and
South Korea, there has not been a sufficient move from awareness to action on
the part of other powers. The Chinese
naval challenge is apparent as an aspect
of an increasingly far-flung Chinese defense system that has serious implications for Western interests in the
Middle East and South Asia—implications that are not addressed by counterinsurgency capability.
JEREMY BLACK

University of Exeter, England

Hasik, James. Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-FirstCentury Defense Industry. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2008. 224pp. $35
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For decades, analysts have understood
the nonmarket conditions of defense
development and procurement. First,
government-as-buyer and ultimate legal
authority are atypical market constraints and, second, military weapons
systems often have no commercial
equivalents and may also have several
unique component or material requirements—for example a one-off electronic component architecture.
The recent trend of fewer systems required, or at least procured, in the
roughly synchronous post–Cold War
and precision-munitions eras has more
often than not exaggerated the already
anomalous defense-systems market.
The Department of Defense (DoD) generally buys or intends to buy smaller
numbers of more capable and complicated ships, manned aircraft, tanks,
munitions, etc., than it has in the past.
Advancing technological sophistication
and relatively smaller unit buys, in turn,
pressure defense-systems suppliers’
business models, alliances and acquisitions, systems integration competencies, and subassembly, component, and
material supply chains.
James Hasik is a defense industry analyst and former naval officer with degrees in history, physics, and business.
His first book (coauthored with Michael Rip in 2002) was a well received,
comprehensive examination of GPS and
its implications in modern warfare.
With this book, Hasik continues his insightful analysis of the DoD toolbox via
a set of six case studies covering disparate defense-system development projects woven into a succinct but
overarching analysis of the current international arms industry. The cases examined are air, land, sea, and space
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systems, each a precision-guided
weapon project and a mission-planning
system.
The book’s foremost merit is its sober
analysis, grounded in business economics. Each case covers technological, economic, and operational trade-offs and
frames each project within a relevant
and timely international business context. For example, Hasik’s space-system
case emphasizes the competencies and
alliances of the few firms competing in
the satellite business. He explores the
credible competition for the SpaceBased Infrared System Low (SBIRS
Low) satellite contract by the fivehundred-employee Spectrum Astro
Corporation against the established and
significantly larger firm TRW Inc.
Hasik’s land-vehicle case demonstrates
how the DoD benefited from decades of
prior research and development in
South Africa on blast-resistant vehicle
design, greatly accelerating the Army’s
and Marine Corps’s adaptations for our
current wars. As a bonus, Hasik adroitly
presents the academically rigorous
clearly, and for a reader accustomed to
plowing through the arcane prose of
technical reports and academic papers,
this is no small gift.
The Department of Defense is constantly looking for innovative technologies through its service labs and several
science and technology development
programs. The enduring challenge is in
managing the underlying risk and in the
integration into a complex system-ofsystems life cycle amid competing priorities, operational commitments, and
assessments of the future strategic environment. Although this book could be
more comprehensive, it need not be.
Through his case-study selection and
opening and closing synthesizing

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010

chapters, Hasik provides a cogent and
instructive assessment of innovative
technology development and procurement approaches across defense system
sectors. Arms and Innovation suggests
opportunities for more nimble defense
systems innovation in the future, opportunities that do not require comprehensive acquisition reforms or
reiterations of revolutions in military
affairs.
DAVID FOSTER

Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division
China Lake, California

Yoo, John. Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George
W. Bush. New York: Kaplan, 2009. 524pp. $29.95

John Yoo’s most recent book is far
more than a defense of the George W.
Bush administration, which he served,
as some of his many critics may find it.
In fact, Crisis and Command is a carefully documented study of the exercise
of presidential power from George
Washington to President Obama. This
is the last book in a trilogy by Yoo, the
first two being The Powers of War and
Peace (2005), which explains the founders’ original understanding of the
foreign-affairs power within the
Constitution, and War by Other Means
(2006), which discusses the law and
logic behind the Bush administration’s
counterterrorism policies. This study
extends well beyond the Bush administration, focusing mainly on Presidents
Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt. In each of
these respected leaders Yoo finds bold
presidents who changed the existing political order and transformed it into
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their own. They found distinction by
leading the nation through crises, carefully shaping the direction of national
security policy and recasting the
boundaries of presidential authority.
Through careful historical analysis, Yoo
reminds us that the relationship between presidential greatness and the
exercise of executive power is an
inextricable link that has always taken
advantage of the vague contours of Article II of the Constitution, which addresses executive authority. In his
historical analysis, Yoo carefully traces
the founders’ work at the Constitutional Convention to accommodate the
executive’s energy and decisiveness
within a workable constitutional
framework.
In quelling the Whiskey Rebellion and
addressing the Indian uprisings of
1789–90, the first U.S. president believed that Congress having created a
military, he had the authority to decide
when and how to use it. In the latter
case, Washington sought no authority
from Congress when he directed an attack on the Wabash and Illinois Indians
150 miles within their territory. Similarly, in the Prize Cases, President Lincoln concluded, and the Supreme Court
agreed, that after hostile acts are directed against this nation the president
is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any legislative authority.
President Roosevelt went even farther
prior to the Second World War by taking action to assist Britain through the
Lend-Lease program and to isolate Japan from critical resources without
congressional approval or consultation,
actions that clearly provoked Japan and
drew the United States ever closer to
war.
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A later section in the book reflects the
application of this lengthy historical
analysis to the current administration
and to the response of the Bush administration to 9/11. Yoo points out that
President Bush looked to former presidents for support of his actions. He
states succinctly that “Congress simply
does not have the ability to make effective, long-term national security decisions because of the difficulty in
organizing 535 legislators and the political incentives that drive them toward
short-term, risk-averse thinking.”
In his closing thoughts, Yoo reflects on
President Obama’s early determination
to close the detention facility at
Guantanamo, to terminate the CIA’s
special authority to question terrorists,
and to suspend military commissions in
the middle of the trials of al-Qa‘ida
leaders for war crimes. Describing the
new president’s law enforcement approach to terrorist violence, he asks
whether this approach, although popular with his liberal supporters, can be
successful. He finds hope in recent decisions by President Obama, however, in
increasing troop levels in Afghanistan
and in the increased use of Predator
drones. He observes that the new president may be learning to “draw on the
mainspring of Presidential power as
deeply as his greatest predecessors.”
COL. JAMES P. TERRY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, RETIRED

Chairman, Veterans Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Cloud, David, and Greg Jaffe. The Fourth Star:
Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future
of the United States Army. New York: Crown,
2009. 330pp. $28
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Journalists David Cloud and Greg Jaffe
have attempted to provide a narrative
of the U.S. Army from the end of the
Vietnam War through the present wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan by tracing the
careers of four Army general officers.
Using biographic sketches of Generals
John Abizaid, George Casey, Peter
Chiarelli, and David Petraeus, The
Fourth Star seeks to show how the
Army has changed doctrinally and developed its leaders. Cloud and Jaffe deliver a story that is engaging, although
short on analysis, explaining how as an
institution the Army adapted postVietnam. As a result of their approach,
the story of the “epic struggle” for the
Army’s future between fighting counterinsurgencies and conventional battles is anecdotal at best. The scholarly
opinions that have shaped the debate
over the future Army doctrine are
missing.
Cloud and Jaffe argue that the Department of Social Sciences (“Sosh”) at West
Point was instrumental in shaping the
strategic thinking of these Army leaders
as well as of the Army as an institution.
The book attributes the unconventional
thinking of Petraeus and Chiarelli to
their experiences as Sosh instructors.
Cloud and Jaffe explain how Petraeus
collaborated with Andrew Krepinevich
(author of The Army and Vietnam,
1988), to place the blame for the service’s failures in Vietnam directly on the
Army. Throughout the text, the authors
are careful to note Sosh alumni who
serve with or under these generals. Yet
the emphasis on the role of the Sosh faculty in this story is somewhat misleading
—especially since both current and former Sosh faculty are the main sources
for much of the narrative. One could
have easily looked to West Point’s
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Department of History to find similar
connections and influence. The roles of
Dr. Fred Kagan and Brigadier General H.
R. McMaster in shaping the “surge”
strategy of 2007 and 2008 represent an
example.
However, Cloud and Jaffe do succeed in
chronicling four generals whose careers
began at the end of Vietnam and have
culminated in the present. Petraeus is
portrayed as the overly competitive
Francophile infantryman, Abizaid as
the international soldier-student of
Arab culture, Casey as the hard-charging
armor officer, and Chiarelli as the career tanker of Cold War Europe. While
Reagan’s military readied itself for tank
battles with the Soviet Union, these officers were going to graduate school
and thinking seriously about the next
war. In the post–Cold War years, all
four men gained promising reputations
during crises in Kurdish Iraq, Haiti, and
Bosnia.
The chapters on Iraq are the most interesting. Abizaid, as commander of U.S.
Central Command, seems to understand the challenges of a post-Saddam
Iraq but is powerless to stop the rush
toward de-Baathification. Petraeus, for
his part, appears as the imperious commander, acting as a statesman and commander in creating a post-Saddam
government in Mosul. Conversely,
Casey seems overwhelmed, coming to
terms with his errant assumption about
defeating the insurgency through elections and politics by the end of 2006. By
the end of the book, Abizaid and Casey
have become the older, ineffectual
model of the post-Vietnam Army, while
Chiarelli and Petraeus are the newer,
progressive model—the Army that emphasizes protecting the people over protecting the force.
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The Fourth Star offers additional understanding to events already described by
fellow journalists Bob Woodward, Tom
Ricks, and Linda Robinson. However,
the book about this epic struggle for the
future of the Army doctrine is still yet
to be written.
LT. COL. JON SCOTT LOGEL, U.S. ARMY

Naval War College

Miller, Aaron David. The Much Too Promised
Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli
Peace. New York: Bantam, 2008. 407pp. $26

This interesting book aims at unraveling a significant mystery that has lain at
the heart of international diplomacy for
more than a generation: Why and how
has America failed to bring lasting
peace to the Middle East? Specifically,
why, despite so much expended American money and political effort, does
peace between the Jordan River valley
and the Mediterranean look as far off
today as in the last forty years? Answers
to this question have never been lacking, yet few authors have tried to tackle
it comprehensively and fairly.
There are few individuals better placed
to answer this question than Aaron David Miller, a scholar-diplomat who was
an eyewitness to much of the drama he
recounts, having served as an adviser on
the Middle East to six U.S. secretaries of
state. Miller’s prose is accessible and
more, as he draws the reader into behindthe-scenes vignettes that make the most
of a topic that is potentially mindnumbing, given its complexities and
nuances. The author is refreshingly
open about his biases as an American
Jew whose emotions about the plight of
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the Palestinians are sincere, as are his
not-infrequent frustrations with the Israelis. His notion that both Israelis and
Palestinians are caught in a macabre
diplomatic dance that occasionally
delves into comedies of the absurd
would merit a smile, were it not for the
countless lives—and, as Miller demonstrates, diplomatic careers—that have
been wrecked while the band plays on.
Miller’s vivid, usually empathetic descriptions of the cast of characters alone
are worth the price of admission. This is
diplomatic history at its most accessible
and enjoyable. Miller’s lively work is
thoroughly researched, including interviews with almost all the dramatis personae, so this is much more than a
you-are-there account. The author’s
analysis of the problems that he, like so
many others, failed to unravel fully is
candid and detailed, and it will be a reference source for future generations of
scholars.
Moreover, The Much Too Promised
Land deserves high praise for finding
paths through all the major minefields,
not least the vexing issue of the Israeli
lobby, the alleged den of limitless Jewish money and aggressively neocon influence on U.S. foreign and defense
policy. While not all readers will accept
Miller’s answers, the fair-minded will
appreciate the care and tact with which
he addresses them. In this sense, this
work is a polite refutation of such recent academic writings as those of Professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen
Walt, who have perhaps indulged in an
overdrawn analysis of Israeli influence
in Washington, D.C.
In his conclusion, Miller offers some
thoughtful guideposts to thinking about
this never-ending problem and what it
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means for regional and international
security. Considering that the ArabIsraeli dispute looks as intractable as
ever (and that the Jewish state is facing
demographic crises that threaten to
overwhelm it by the end of this century,
if not before) the author’s counsel, including a plea for humility, is refreshing
and much needed. His concluding
thought about America’s role in the
peace process, that “although we remain
vital to peacemaking, we can’t drive the
train as much as I once believed,” is a fitting one and captures the essence of the
author—a thoughtful observer, seasoned
analyst, veteran diplomatist, readable
scholar, and all-around mensch.
JOHN R. SCHINDLER

Naval War College

Law, Randall D. Terrorism: A History. Cambridge,
U.K.: Polity, 2009. 342pp. $24.95

Rarely is a book written to fulfill the author’s own need for a scholarly work on
a topic that he teaches at university. So
when Associate Professor Randall Law
determined that he must write a book
on the history of terrorism, he sought
to satisfy a need not only for himself
but for other professors and researchers
who deal with the subject. According to
Law, “When I started teaching a course
on the subject shortly after September
11, 2001, I could not find a book for my
students that told this story in a clear
chronological fashion, that provided
sufficient analytical framework, that
made use of the most recent scholarly
work, and that was comprehensive but
succinct.” Law’s book does exactly what
he intended.
Dr. Law, a historian, immediately wrestles with his own working definition
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of terrorism with two core assertions.
The first is that individuals or groups
act through rational and conscious decision making within political and cultural contexts. Therefore, according to
Law, terrorism is not “a kind of madness.” His second states that terrorism
is a communicative act intended to influence the behavior of the audience.
Consequently, the author emphasizes a
correlation between terrorism and the
media throughout the book.
An astute reader might ask on what basis the author chose certain groups and
historical events. Actually, Law selected
three viewpoints that would give the
reader a broad understanding of the
complexity of the subject. The first is
what he calls the “terrorist toolbox,” a
set of tactics, behaviors, and methods
normally associated with terrorism. The
second is that terrorism is “violent theater” that leverages symbols and provocatively violent acts. The third
viewpoint is that terrorism has become
a cultural construct, while the word itself connotes illegitimacy or is used as a
label to vilify enemies.
Although concise and of a nice, workable size for classroom use, the volume
treats terrorism with a stunningly
all-encompassing approach. Its sixteen
chapters truly span the historical, cultural, and political underpinnings of
terrorism.
As one who teaches graduate courses on
terrorism to federal, state, local, and
tribal law-enforcement professionals, as
well as military leaders, I found this
book to be a welcome addition to the
multitude of scholarly materials on terrorism. Randall Law has written the
quintessential work on the subject, one
that is provocative and educational, and
will stimulate a necessary dialogue for
future decision makers.
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JEFFREY H. NORWITZ

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Georgia

McCarthy, Andrew C. Willful Blindness: A Memoir of the Jihad. New York: Encounter Books,
2008. 250pp. $25.95

For anyone who has followed, however
peripherally, the disposition of those
who have come to be called “detainees”
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Andrew McCarthy’s Willful Blindness is
a mandatory read. McCarthy was the
prosecuting U.S. attorney in the case of
the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdel
Rahman, for the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center. The book chronicles McCarthy’s prosecutorial clean
sweep in that case, in which ten defendants were convicted and the remaining
two pleaded guilty. McCarthy details
with great insight and clarity the conspiracy to bomb the World Trade Center and the tortuous road of the
prosecutorial effort after the attack
—tortuous because the available law
enforcement and prosecutorial tools
were either antiquated or inadequate to
cope with the enormity and complexity
of the perpetrators’ efforts.
The United States has been grappling
for years with how to treat and process
those who have been captured and held
during the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Protocols of neither intelligence,
justice, nor the treatment of prisoners
have proved adequate to deal sensibly
and reliably with a diffuse yet tight-knit
group of adversaries.
The book begins with the chapter
“Imagine the Liability!” referring to a
concern of the FBI that an informant
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placed in the inner circle of the conspirators might materially contribute to the
success of the operation. Indeed, the
informant in this case worked his way
into the conspiracy only because of his
bomb-making skills. His FBI handlers
envisioned a very difficult legal battle if,
despite the warning provided by their
informant, the plot nevertheless succeeded. As a result, the informant was
extracted and hidden before the actual
target or timing of the effort had been
discovered. Through the efforts of their
informant, the FBI knew that something was afoot, but they did not know
precisely when or where, having
exfiltrated their undercover source before he could gain access to that critical
information.
Although this work reads much like a
novel, it offers clear examples of how
laws and procedures established for a
very different context can have severe
and unanticipated side effects.
As a single example of many mentioned
in the book, the process of discovery
during the preparation for trial can
cause to be divulged important information that should be protected. As is
routine in such matters, in the course of
the pretrial workup a list of unindicted
coconspirators is developed. On such a
list, in 1994, was the name Osama Bin
Laden. Appropriately, under U.S. law,
the list was made available to defense
attorneys for the accused; it was subsequently leaked to Bin Laden, who was
in Kenya at the time. As McCarthy
writes, “Think, though, how valuable
[the fact] that [he was on the list]
would be for bin Laden to know. If you
are he, you say: ‘Maybe the government
has an informant in my inner circle.
Maybe I should use a different phone.
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Maybe I should stop having meetings in
my usual places because they might be
bugged.’”
Finally, this book is helpful for connecting the dots after the fact, for reconsidering how such adversaries think and
plan. For example, McCarthy points to
statements made three weeks prior to
the actual attack of the USS Cole in October 2000 by Sheikh Omar’s son, and
also to the writings of Nidal Ayyad, one
of those convicted in 1995 of the first
attack on the World Trade Center: “We
promise you that next time it will be
very precise and the World Trade Center will continue to be one [of] our
targets.”
ROGER W. BARNETT, PROFESSOR EMERITUS

Naval War College

Casey, Steven. Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion, 1950–1953.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008. 476pp. $55

The far left and the far right have something in common, especially when their
enemies hold the White House. They
each tend to think that the president
can get away with anything, because he
controls the media and the media controls the public, especially when it
comes to issues of war. Professor Steven
Casey of the London School of Economics actually knows something about
this topic, usually the realm of strong
opinions based on strong prejudice. In
2000 Casey wrote perhaps the most
perceptive study ever published on
presidential policy and public opinion
during World War II. His Cautious
Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War against
Nazi Germany (2001) demonstrated
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that FDR late in the war could not lead
the public to change its opinion that the
Nazi Party, not the German people, was
the primary culprit of German aggression. The president did not make this
distinction, but the country focused
blame on Hitler and his inner circle,
whom the Allies would remove from
power. They would not sanction the
plan of Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Morgenthau to dismantle German industry or to smash the German nation
into a bunch of separate principalities.
Why punish the people for the sins of
their deposed government?
Casey takes on President Harry S.
Truman under different, later circumstances. Truman wanted to “de-escalate,”
so to speak, public opinion lest it lead
to World War III versus China and the
Soviet Union. The president, in this effort, refused to call the Korean conflict
a “war,” as opposed to “a police action,” his fateful phrase first uttered at a
press conference on 29 June 1950. This
signal to the American people did not
work out as the White House planned,
as Korea quickly turned out to be a war
by everyone’s definition—except that of
executive branch officials, who inadvertently freed the administration’s opponents from pressure to mute their
criticism, which is what the minority
usually does during a war lest it flirt
with disloyalty. “The administration’s
subdued public posture,” says Casey,
“often afforded the Republican opposition the perfect opportunity to take the
offensive.” Indeed, the public seemed
mystified about government policy, as
one State Department official pointed
out: “Those who approved our resistance [to the communist invasion] in
Korea now find the present situation
completely confusing and baffling.”

9
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A student of the Korean War can now
understand why the administration had
such difficulty containing Douglas
MacArthur before firing him on 11
April 1951. Could the White House
come up with a line to rival the general’s riveting message: “There is no
substitute for victory”? Perhaps, but it
could not deliver one, since its credibility was largely shot by mid-1951, when
Truman registered 23 percent public
approval, the lowest in the history of
the Gallup Poll. In a battle of sound
bites, General Omar Bradley, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had to rescue administration policy by testifying
that MacArthur’s proposal to attack
China “was the wrong war, at the
wrong place, against the wrong enemy.”
One hears that Casey’s next book will
be about the U.S. Army and correspondents in World Wars I and II. This
reader would have preferred that he
pushed on into the next war—doing
presidents, policy, the media, and public opinion during Vietnam. For those
of us particularly interested in those
topics, Casey would thus produce a trilogy on wartime policy worthy of the
three volumes on military operations
produced by Douglas Southall Freeman
(Lee’s Lieutenants, on the U.S. Civil
War) and Rick Atkinson (The Liberation Trilogy on the U.S. Army in the European theater in World War II). Yes,
Steven Casey is that good.
MICHAEL PEARLMAN

Lawrence, Kansas

Hendrix, Henry J. Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2009. 288pp. $34.95
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Commander Henry J. Hendrix has written a neat monograph based on his doctoral work. He makes two related
arguments: first, that one cannot understand the diplomatic style of President Theodore Roosevelt without first
understanding his attitude toward the
efficacy and use of naval power; and
second, that the existing literature has
not adequately integrated naval and
military historical methods of analysis
with existing diplomatic historical approaches. Consequently, previous interpretations of Roosevelt’s foreign policy
decisions, as they relate to incidents
that involved the use of naval power,
are incomplete, precisely because they
do not fuse the diplomatic and political
with the naval—especially the perspective reflected by the navalist attitudes of
Theodore Roosevelt.
As for structure, the book begins with
the now-common device of the narrative vignette—in this case the “sailing of
the Great White Fleet,” as a means of
establishing the ambience of the moment of the great president and his
great fleet. With the reader now interested in “the rest of the story,” Hendrix
proceeds in a workmanlike and professional manner, establishing in the first
chapter the basis for the beginning of
the “beautiful relationship” between TR
and the object of his affection and desire, the U.S. Navy. Included here is the
story of Roosevelt’s famous action as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy regarding the deployment of Admiral George
Dewey’s Far East Squadron to Manila
Bay. This episode may be regarded as
typical of Roosevelt’s activist attitudes
and actions regarding the Navy.
The remaining chapters focus topically.
The closing chapter on the Great White
Fleet is the only one that deals directly
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with the linkage of the U.S. Navy to an
“American Century.” The odd man out
is the chapter on technology, although
it is a welcome discussion, given both
TR’s fascination with new technology
and the inherently high-tech nature of
navies in general. Additionally, this
chapter provides ammunition for a
much larger argument about modern
Americans and their fascination with
technology.
However, the bulk of the book deals
with the diplomatic-naval arguments
mentioned. Hendrix makes an excellent
case for his thesis that previous historians have paid too little attention to the
intersection of naval and diplomatic
trends of analysis. He employs a
multidisciplinary approach that examines naval signals, logbooks, war plans,
and other archival Department of the
Navy records to render less opaque
some of TR’s diplomatic actions and
motivations.
Although this work is not a biography,
it adds value to existing ones, especially
Edmund Morris’s Theodore Rex, which
focuses exclusively on his presidency.
Theodore Roosevelt had many different
personae, and it has not escaped historians that he was not only a historian
but also a naval historian, par excellence. Neither has it escaped them that,
along with A. T. Mahan and Stephen
Luce, he is the father of the modern
U.S. Navy. However, Hendrix makes a
strong argument that TR’s naval persona was critical to understanding his
use of power, especially in foreign
relations.
The book’s minor weakness is its narrow, monographic scope. The chapters
proceed in a generally chronological
manner but maintain no extended narrative thread—the unifier, instead, is
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the topical theme. Hendrix may have
missed an opportunity to make a larger
statement about the relationship of the
man to the institution and its importance to the United States under the entire Roosevelt “dynasty.” There is much
peripheral evidence here about the institutional and organizational aspects of
the Navy that made this reviewer long
for more discussion. TR’s presidency
was a time of profound change in the
military establishment of the United
States, a period that involved the Root
reforms of the Army and the establishment of the General Board of the Navy,
as a sort of proto–naval general staff.
TR’s role in these critical early years of
the General Board would have been
worth exploring.
These are minor quibbles in an otherwise fine book that adds substantially to
the understanding of an important aspect of the rise of the United States to
great-power status and influence during
Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency. I recommend this book for a broad audience, especially those interested in the
development and execution of American foreign policy in the early twentieth
century.
JOHN T. KUEHN

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Brooks, Max. World War Z: An Oral History of
the Zombie War. New York: Crown, 2006. 352pp.
$14.95

“A breath of fresh air stormed into the
Naval War College over the rotting
flesh of the undead,” reads the first
book-club selection of the President
of the Naval War College. Without
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vilifying another country or radicalizing
any group, World War Z’s zombie pandemic and ensuing global chaos are the
vehicle transporting the reader straight
into the potential realities of what can
happen when the functionality and
safety of our cultural norms, personal
values, societal ethics, and governmental structures are stressed, overwhelmed, and broken.
A quick title scan of current military
and national security professional reading lists suggests that there is something
different about the selection; most are
exclusively works of nonfiction, and
none of them have the word “zombie”
in their titles. However, one does not
have to be a zombie fan to enjoy this
book. Another consideration is that if
any book passes the zealous scrutiny of
a cultlike following of “zombie-ophiles” and the similarly exacting standards of the President of the Naval War
College, this should spark your curiosity—if not an automatic “add” click for
your personal military and national security reading list.
World War Z is a work of apocalyptic
fiction set in modern times and told in
a journalistic style. Man is the main
character; the zombie simply provides
the literary mechanism facilitating a
journey into “total war.” The book
opens and reads like, and brings about
imagery combining, George Romero’s
1968 classic Night of the Living Dead,
Quentin Tarantino’s often eclectic and
avant-garde directing style, and Tom
Clancy and Clive Cussler’s flair for
globe-trotting storytelling. Attention to
historical detail, geopolitical issues, and
nuances of social and applied sciences
makes it intriguing for most nonfiction
and historical-fiction purists. Three
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years of research and the confirmation
of all facts and assertions by a professional “fact-checker” enable readers
to focus and to immerse themselves
into the horrifying musings of what
can happen when mankind faces
annihilation.
The narrative travels beyond the brink
of extinction and continues on a journey of choice, response, societal resilience, and recovery. These choices and
actions allow one to go beyond contemplation and explore the potential preventive measures and solutions needed
not only to survive but to win.
Are there any negatives about World
War Z? There are, and readers can find
their own likes and dislikes. One notable point is the physiological and biological improbabilities associated with
the ability of zombies to exist and survive, but as with all science fiction,
some bending of reality is to be expected. On occasion political biases
creep into the writing where perhaps
more neutral or nuanced references
would have been more effective and less
distracting. Those comments aside,
World War Z is a great read.
The most telling local review of the
book, here at the Naval War College, is
the number of students and faculty
who, as parents, have said they were going to share the book and read it again
with their children as part of developing
their understanding about the world,
and people’s responsibilities to themselves and one another. Applying this
metric, World War Z is a worthy choice
for any reader, be they practitioners of
national security or not.
LT. COL. JAYME SUTTON, U.S. ARMY

Naval War College
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